Two cases ofcarcinoma of the stomach presenting during the same month and dying within four weeks of one another less than one year later are presented. One was treated symptomatically and the other received radical surgery. The care they received depended on decisions about diagnosis and treatment; the outcomes of these and the difficulties involved in evaluating monetary costs and quality of care are discussed in the light of recent interest in medical audit.
Introduction
Quality, cost of care and decision making are fashionable topics in medical journals. Much that is written applies to populations rather than individuals.' But doctors as arbiters of technical quality, controllers of resources, and professional decision makers are being increasingly pressed to consider such issues in their own practice. A recent meeting, for instance, of the Association of Canadian Medical Colleges discussed among other things 'Training the Cost Conscious Physician'. 2 The impetus for much of this arises from a widely felt need to moderate rising health costs. The resulting ethical dilemma lies in the conflict between the individual's right to health care and society's need to limit and share finite resources.3 In its most dramatic form this issue, as seen in terms of costs and outcomes of intensive care,4 is largely based on the assumption that prolongation of life in the hope of cure, however small, is fundamental to a physicians practice. 5 It is unfortunate that, in the pursuit of the inexorable logic of this assumption, care is often neglected and that monetary costs and unquantifiable costs in terms of patient dignity and autonomy are accumulated.
These issues were highlighted by two patients with carcinoma of the stomach who presented during the same month. One was treated symptomatically, the other received radical surgery. One year later both died at home within four weeks of one another. A review of the care they received demonstrates some of the difficulties of objective assessment of quality of care. During an unsolicited house call on 9 January, the patient described occasional pain but he was cheerful and sleeping well. Both he and his wife had discussed the situation and appeared to accept it. Gevrabon(R) was prescribed as a tonic.
By 20 April his epigastric discomfort had increased but it responded to acetaminophen and codeine. He could eat soup and puddings only.
There was a firm mass in the abdomen but no additional action was taken.
On Following discussion between houseman and general practitioner he was advised that a small cancer had been found that could be removed surgically. When the abdomen was opened at operation on 20 October the tumour was invading the fatty omentum, and lymph nodes along the greater and lesser curves of the stomach, at the oesophago-gastric junction and at the root of the spleen were involved. An 80 per cent subtotal gastrectomy, omentectomy and splenectomy were performed and histologically all lymph nodes were invaded by tumour. The patient was assured that his cancer had been removed. His rapid recovery was complicated by dumping* which responded to medical management.
He saw his general practitioner at monthly intervals and attended outpatients in December and February. He appeared to be doing well though he remained 3 kg below his pre-operative weight. In the clinic on 9 July he complained of loss of appetite and bloating after meals for two months and he had clearly lost weight. Both he and his family were anxious but were strongly reassured that recurrence had not occurred. Antacids, multi-vitamins and parenteral vitamin BI2 were prescribed. Two weeks later he described severe regurgitation, heartburn and coughing whenever he ate. His family thought he was too weak for outpatient investigation and he was admitted. Endoscopy showed a rigid stomach due to recurrence of tumour.
Because of his severe symptoms and distress it was decided to offer palliative radiotherapy and chemotherapy. Further gastric radiology and liver scanning were employed to determine the extent of *A Syndrome which often follows surgical removal of the stomach, which may consist of belching, bloating and fullness of the abdomen, or a faint, hungry feeling with sweating.
recurrence. He was unable to leave his bed because he was so wasted and an attempt was made to improve his nutrition prior to therapy. However he removed a naso-gastric feeding tube himself because of extreme discomfort, and intravenous hyperalimentation by a peripheral route met with numerous technical problems. Ward staff noted he was depressed and thought he should make more effort to eat.
By mid-August it was thought he had improved a little and treatment was begun with radiotherapy totalling 3500 rads and chemotherapy of 300-500 mg 5-fluorouracil over I0 days. However, the next day he was unexpectedly found to be severely anaemic (haemoglobin 4.7 g per ioo ml) and five units of packed red blood cells were transfused. Demerol (a type of pethidine) 50 mg im was prescribed (6-hourly pm and at night) as analgesic (but he received only 4 doses over 6 days). Radiotherapy continued and an intravenous catheter to the subclavian vein was inserted which survived only 24 hours. He had a fever on 22 August with extensive thrombophlebitis of one arm and a right middle lobe infiltrate on chest x-ray. The antibiotic Cloxacillin was given through the remaining peripheral vein in the right leg, and changed to penicillin and ampicillin when blood cultures grew a-haemolytic streptococci. He was miserable and on 7 August began to vomit blood.
It was decided to discontinue active treatment and he was discharged home. His general practitioner noted that he was terminally ill and followed the hospital discharge recommendations to give Demerol as necessary. The patient rapidly became comatose and died on I0 September. Discussion A description of two patients, with tumours at different sites, treated differently from presentation provides little factual information about carcinoma of the stomach. It can however be used to explore some of the important issues which are often concealed or ignored by large scale studies, and has the added impact of dealing with individuals rather than generalities.
The discussion will concentrate on three areas, the diagnostic decision, the treatment decision and the outcome, and an attempt will be made to demonstrate that the reconciliation of audit as an educational tool with audit as a means of moderating costs is dependant on attitudinal changes.
Diagnostic decision Both patients were diagnosed by their family physician, the endoscopist providing confirmation only. In patient A, 6 weeks elapsed between presentation and diagnosis by which time patient B had had definitive treatment (Table I ). This Patient B on the other hand consented to surgical intervention; apart from his choice of whether or not to sign his operative consent form there is no record of his being offered any alternative.
One view of this situation is that 'in matters of life and death doctors are not merely operations analysts who formulate the choice for the executive; they are professional decision makers who not only diagnose but decide for the consumer because they decide with less pain, less regret, cooler nerves, and a mind less flooded with alternating hopes and fears.'10 In the absence of impersonal rules physicians are, however, frequently anxious about their treatment decision. A recent report on the care of the hopelessly ill11 attempts to remedy this by providing guidelines which relieve individuals of personal guilt for their decisions.
As a group, physicians display more anxiety about their deaths than the rest of the population.12 Despite the ideal view of the cool calculating professional, these attitudes almost certainly affect the way in which doctors evaluate treatment choices and subsequently present them to patients. Whether or not and why patients accept or refuse such offers is an uncharted area. But one can speculate that the need for hope and for death as the enemy to be defeated, besides not being in the best interests of the individual or of society, 13 are commodities which are more highly valued by the medical profession than the public.
The decision to treat patient B cost between $762.oo and $2224.00 (Table I) (Table I ). There were also other less easily quantifiable but nevertheless important costs which were accumulated by patient B.
Conclusion
Quality of care has been operationally defined as the extent to which scientifically established procedures in diagnosis and treatment are properly applied to patients who can benefit from their application.' 7 This approach focuses on the efficacy of procedures, and studies have already suggested guidelines for use of various treatments. 18 The problem however is that large areas will remain unquantifiable by these means, and the danger is that guidelines may, by failing to look at underlying assumptions, justify the status quo instead of acting as agents of change motivating individual doctors to new levels of awareness and practice. 19 In this case some simple things can be measured.
Patient A lived less time but spent more time at home (Table II to days of life, and days at home as opposed to days in hospital is even more problematic. Subjectively however, there seems to be a case to be made that in patient B the attempt to cure was not only costly but pre-empted adequate caring. If this case is accepted, then it can be seen that audit using objective tests of efficacy to reduce costs and improve quality is unlikely to be effective unless it is prepared firstly to question assumptions such as the belief that prolongation of life and cure is the objective ofmedical management, and secondly to make subjective value judgments about the quality of life. If however it is prepared to do this, then we may find that caring begins to be valued as highly as attempted curing, and that patients are more realistically involved in decision making with the result that physicians may be surprised to find more of their patients refusing marginally beneficial procedures. If this should happen then costs may indeed be reduced, and the dilemma of the physician who says that 'I know of a treatment that may help you, but as I balance your condition against that of society you lose out'1 could become redundant.
